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no liability for there would have been no damage to a legal person.Y- This
"biological" theory of recovery would also permit a remedy under wrongful
death statutes where the infant died after it had been born alive, while, at the
same time it would also permit the courts to deny recovery under wrongful
death statutes where the infant was not born alive.
With approval of this view it is submitted that such cause of action is, in
theory at least, soundly founded without sacrificing any fundamental legal con-
cepts or established principles.
EXTENSION OF MIIacPHERSON v. BUICK TO REAL ESTATE
EN NEW YORK
New York, which enunciated the doctrine of MacPlxrson v. Buick Motor
Co.,' and thereby made the manufacturer of a chattel, "reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made,"2 liable in negligence to re-
mote users, has now extended the rule to real estate to include those who plan
(architects) and those who erect (building contractors) structures. In Inman
v. Binghamton Housing Autlwrity,3 three years after a building had been
completed and accepted by the owner, a child was injured when he fell from
a stoop which had been constructed without a protective railing. The court
found the distinction between a chattel and structure built upon the land purely
technical and stated unequivocally that: " 'the principle inherent' in the Mac-
Phersmo doctrine applies to determine the liability of architects or builders
for their handiwork .... "'
PRIOR LAW
It has heretofore been said that one not a party to the contract could not
complain of an injury arising out of the negligent performance of the con-
tract.3 In the field of personal property this rule of privity was first under-
mined by the celebrated cases of Th-wnas v. WinchcsterG and Devlhn v.
32. That is not to say that the mother would not have a remedy for her own injuries.
1. 217 N.Y. 3S2, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. Some jurisdictions erroneously still appear to require
that the chattel be "inherently" or "imminently dangerous" per se, thus greatly limiting
the application of the rule. New York follows the more liberal interpretation, imposing
liability upon the manufacturer of any article which was inherently dangerous because
it was negligently constructed, which is quite different from imposing liability upon
manufacturers of inherently dangerous articles when such articles are negligently constructed.
Certain lower courts in New York, however, have confusedly failed to make this distinction.
For an excellent discussion on this point, see Dais, A Re-Examination of The Doctrine of
MacPherson v. Buick and Its Application and _xtension in the State of New York, 24
Fordham L. Rev. 204 (1955).
3. 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895 (1957).
4. Id. at 144, 143 N.E.2d at S99.
5. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (EL 1842).
6. 6 N.Y. 397 (1352), dealing with a mislabeled bottle of belladonna, held the manu-
facturer liable to a third party since it was "imminently dangerous."
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Smith,7 and subsequently destroyed by the MacPherson case. Since the
latter decision, the doctrine has been extended to manufacturers of com-
ponent parts,8 intermediate suppliers who fail to make a reasonable inspection
to discover defects,9 negligent repairmen, 10 and to property damage claims."
However, in most jurisdictions, the MacPherson doctrine, even today, has yet to
change the traditional rule that a building contractor is not answerable to third
persons injured as a result of his negligent performance once he has completed
the building and it has been accepted by the owner. 12 Even in New York, the
doctrine had not, until the Inman case, been extended into the area of real estate
structures.13
The reasons advanced for the rule, the application of which has caused the
liability of contractors to lag thirty years behind that of manufacturers of
chattels,14 are varied. One is the lack of privity of contract; 15 another is the
fact that the contractor had no control over the offending structure at the time
of the injury; 16 a third is that acceptance by the owner is an intervening
agency which breaks the chain of causality, thereby making the owner the
proximate cause of the injury and the contractor only remotely the cause; a7
another is a public policy argument to the effect that if such a broad duty
is imposed, no one would become a contractor,' 8 and there would be no end of
litigation.' 9 At best, the reasons represent a judicial excuse for a result at once
7. 89 N.Y. 470 (1882), dealing with a negligently constructed scaffold, held the third
party could recover, since it was "imminently dangerous."
8. Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932).
9. LaRocca v. Farrington, 301 N.Y. 247, 93 N.E.2d 829 (1950).
10. Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y. Supp. 657 (4th
Dep't 1933).
11. Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 263 N.Y. 463,
189 N.E. 551 (1934).
12. Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926). Note that the Ford case cited the
MacPherson decision, but regarded it only as an application of an already existing exception,
viz. inherently dangerous goods. This is clearly erroneous in light of the later correct
liberal treatment of the case by the courts. See also Erie & Western Transp. Co. v. Chicago,
178 Fed. 42 (7th Cir. 1910); The Mayor of Albany v. Cunliff, 2 N.Y. 165 (1849);
Coleman v. Guidone & Son, Inc., 192 App. Div. 120, 182 N.Y. Supp. 625 (2d Dep't 1920);
Delney v. Supreme Inv. Co., 251 Wis. 374, 29 N.W.2d 754 (1947).
13. For an earlier indication that the Court of Appeals would adopt this position, see
Adams v. White Constr. Co., 299 N.Y. 641, 87 N.E.2d 52 (1949).
14. Prosser, Torts § 85 (2d ed. 1955).
15. Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Galbraith v. Illinois Steel Co., 133
Fed. 485 (7th Cir. 1904); Salliote v. King Bridge Co., 122 Fed. 378 (6th Cir. 1903).
16. Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919); Cunningham v.
T. A. Gillespie Co., 241 Mass. 280, 135 N.E. 105 (1922).
17. Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 196 N.W. 171 (1923) ; Travis v. Rochester
Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919). In the Travis case, the court affected a distinc-
tion between manufacturers and contractors by stating that the builder's work is done
under the supervision, inspection, and often plans of the employer (hence intervening cause),
while a manufacturer is in complete control prior to distribution to the public.
18. Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
19. Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832 (1924).
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illogical and inconsistent with the rule applied in cases involving the sale of
chattels.
ADOPTION OF THE MAcPHEPSoN RULE
In time the courts began to recognize the inequities which a strict adherence
to the rule would produce, and began to temper its application. Thus, a third
party was allowed a cause of action where the structure was imminently danger-
ous to life and limb; 20 where the contractor, with Imowledge of the latent
defect, turned over the structure to the owner without disclosure-liability being
based on "something like fraud"; 21 where the court found an implied invitation
from the fact that the structure was certain to be used by someone other than the
contractee; 22 and where the condition created was a nuisance per se.2 It is well
to note, however, that in these cases the courts paid lip service to the old
general rule, regarding their decisions as exceptions. It was not until section
385 of the Restatement of Torts2 4 was announced that the contractor, whose
work has been accepted, was placed on the same basis as a manufacturer.
Moran v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co.,2 the first case to adopt this section
of the Restatement, represents a complete overthrow of the old general rule.
Other jurisdictions, though still the minority, have followed suit.-O There is
also substantial secondary authority in support of the extension." It is well
to point out, however, that the extension does not constitute a departure from
the rule of non-liability, where as a matter of fact, the owner's positive acts
operate as an intervening cause.2 8 Where the owner actively supervises and
inspects the construction job, a question of fact is presented as to whether or
not such activity constitutes a breach in the chain of causation.
APPLICATIoN OF THE DOCTRINE To REAL PROPERTY
The Court of Appeals in the Inmau case was quick to correct the appellate
division which had indicated its approval of the extension.2 0 The Court of
Appeals stated that all the essential elements of MacPkerson v. Buick must be
present to apply the doctrine. 0 The court found latency of the defect to be
20. Ibid.
21. Bryson v. Hines, 268 Fed. 290 (4th Cir. 1920); Penn Steel Co. v. Elmore '
Hamilton Contracting Co., 175 Fed. 176 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1909); Murphy v. Barlow Realty
Co., 206 Minn. 527, 239 N.W. 563 (1939).
22. Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 ft. 73, 164 N.E. 162 (1928).
23. Brown v. Welsbach Corp., 301 N.Y. 202, 93 N.E.2d 640 (1950); Schumacher v.
Carl G. Neumann Dredging and Improvement Co., 206 Wis. 220, 239 N.W. 459 (1931).
24. Restatement, Torts § 335 (1939).
25. 166 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. S46 (1943).
26. Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 939 (1956);
Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 283, 201 P.2d 1 (1948); Hunter v. Quality Homes Inc., 45
Del. (6 Terry) 100, 6S A.2d 620 (1949); Russel v. Whitcomb, 10C N.H. 171, 121 A.2d 781
(1956); Foley v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 363 Pa. 1, 63 A.2d 517 (1949).
27. Prosser, Torts § 35 (2d ed. 1955) ; 2 Harper and James, Torts § 28.10 (1956).
28. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 27, § 49.
29. 1 A.D.2d 559, 152 N.Y.S.2d 79 (3d Dep't 1956), rev'd, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d
S95 (1957).
30. 3 N.Y.2d at 145, 143 N.E.2d at 899.
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such an element,31 citing as authority Campo v. Scofield.3 2 In the Campo de-
cision, plaintiff injured his fingers in an onion-topper allegedly due to the lack
of a safety guard. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint due to the
absence of an allegation indicating a latent defect, thereby settling a heretofore
unsettled aspect of the MacPherson doctrine. That decision read with the
instant case conclusively indicates that a manufacturer and contractor will not
be liable to a third party if the offending defect be patent. Quite obviously,
however, much difficulty will arise in determining what is a latent defect and
from whose viewpoint it is to be judged. The latter point is interesting since
the court in the Inman case made no reference in its discussion to the fact that
plaintiff was a two year old infant to whom the absence of a porch rail would
not be a patent defect. One might assume from this that the character of the
defect is not to be viewed from the plaintiff's position, but rather from that
of the present owner whose failure to correct a patent defect, would then operate
as an intervening cause.
Confusing also is the fact that the MacPherson decision does not state
whether imminency of the danger is a condition precedent to the application of
its rule. A sensitive reading of the decision indicates no such requirement.
Yet, there are decisions which, on the basis of lack of imminency, have refused
to apply the MacPherson rule, because the period of safe use of the instru-
mentality had destroyed the quality of imminence.34 However, in jurisdictions
outside of New York, a period of seven33 and twenty years,80 and in the present
New York case, of three years of safe use, would seem to indicate that in the
field of real property, the courts will follow the language of Justice Cardozo
rather than that of his interpreters. Such a decision seems to be a necessary
one, in light of the nature of the building trade and the latency of the defect.
ARCHITECTS
Considering the Court of Appeals' recognition of certain essential elements
as prerequisites to the application of the MacPherson doctrine, it is indeed
31. Ibid.
32. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
33. "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger." 217 N.Y. at 389, 111 N.E.
at 1053. "Subtle distinctions are drawn by the defendant between things inherently
dangerous and things imminently dangerous, but the case does not turn upon these verbal
niceties. If danger was to be expected as reasonably certain, there was a duty of vigilance,
and this whether you call the danger inherent or imminent." Id. at 394, 111 N.E. at
1054-55.
34. Lynch v. International Harvester Co., 60 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1932); Heggblom
v. John Wanamaker, 178 Misc. 792, 36 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. 1942). Both courts referred
to the fact that Justice Cardozo in his MacPherson decision, in citing Loop v. Litchfield,
42 N.Y. 351 (1870), pointed out that "the risk can hardly have been an imminent one,
for the wheel lasted five years before it broke." 217 N.Y. at 386, 111 N.E. at 1052.
35. Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956).
36. Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 232, 201 P.2d 1, 3 (1948): "However, the ex-
ception to the general rule of nonliability stated in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co ...
does not include imminence as a requisite."
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interesting to note the facility with which the court includes architects in the
same breath with building contractors, without any apparent need for discus-
sion. The liability of an architect for damages caused by his negligent work
has been based upon contract,37 criminal law,33 and tort.32 The architect has
not been held to be an insurer of his work, but in the event that his plans were
found to be defective, he was liable for failure to exercise reasonable care in
their preparation to one in privity. There are no reported cases in which the
architect was held liable to third parties not in privity. All the decisions in
which the extension had been applied dealt solely with building contractors.'
Prior to this extension, of all the cases espousing the non-liability theory, only
one is reported where an architect (not supervising on the job) was regarded
on the same basis as a contractor, s and that a memorandum decision adjunct
to Ford v. Stuirgis.4 3 Can it be urged with any degree of force that since under
the prior rule, at least one case treated architects as contractors for tort pur-
poses, the same analogy should be followed under the extension? The answer
must be no, in light of conditions precedent necessary to the application of the
MacPhierson doctrine, that were not necessary to the application of the Ford rule.
The most obviously essential element is that the defendant deal with a product.
Services are what an architect deals in. Even the most liberal application in
the field of personal property, has not yet produced a case where the defendant
was the mere designer of the chattel. It is difficult to see how a blueprint as
such, without more, can cause injury to person or property. Since architects
were afforded the protection of non-liability prior to the extension, it would
seem that logically they should escape the liability now imposed by the exten-
sion, it not being applicable to one rendering services. But even granting the
application of the extension to architects, the question arises: will the effect
be different as to architects who deal in services than as to builders who deal
in products? Should architects be considered in the same light as accountants,
surveyors, attorneys, etc., who incur liability for their negligent language?"4
The leading case in this field is Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,45 in which it is
pointed out that liability will be imposed on the defendant, rendering negligent
services (there an accountant), not if he can foresee loss to some third party,
but only if he can foresee loss to some definite and identified third party.
However, the rationale behind this and similar decisions, is that where in-
tangible economic loss is concerned, rather than tangible harm to person or
property, courts have become alarmed at possible liability of unlmown or
37. Schreiner v. Miller, 67 Iora 91, 24 N.W. 733 (1SS5).
38. State v. Ireland, 126 NJ.L. 444, 20 A.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
39. Lottman v. Barnett, 62 Mo. 159 (1376). Here recovery was not bascd upon negli-
gence in design as causing the injury to the third party, but rather negligence in supervising
the actual construction work, the architect, being in effect the builder.
40. Kortz v. Kimberlin, I53 Ky. 566, 165 S.W. 654 (1914).
41. See note 26 supra.
42. Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
43. 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
44. Prosser, Torts § 83 at 544 (2d ed. 1955).
45. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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